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SHEDDING (FALSE) LIGHT: HOW THE FLORIDA SUPREME 
COURT’S REJECTION OF THE TORT FALSELY IMPLIES 
PROTECTION FOR MEDIA DEFENDANTS 
 
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) 
Kristen Rasmussen* 
Edith and Marty Rapp, a Jewish Florida couple, were married until 
Marty’s death in 2003.1 Bruce Rapp, Marty’s son and Edith’s stepson, 
worked for Jews for Jesus.2 Prior to Marty’s death, Bruce included the 
following account in a Jews for Jesus3 newsletter: 
I had a chance to visit with my father . . . [who] has been ill 
for sometime . . . [O]ne morning Edi[th] began to ask me 
questions about Jesus. I explained how G-d [sic] gave us 
Y’Shua (Jesus) as the final sacrifice for our 
atonement . . . She began to cry, and when I asked her if 
she would like to ask G-d for forgiveness for her sins and 
receive Y’Shua she said yes! My stepmother repeated the 
sinner’s prayer with me-praise G-d!4 
Jews for Jesus published the newsletter on the Internet, where one of 
Edith’s relatives saw it.5 
Alleging that Jews for Jesus falsely, and without her permission, 
stated she had joined the organization and become a believer in its 
tenets, Edith Rapp sued the group for false light invasion of privacy, 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D./M.A.M.C. (Mass Communication) Candidate, University of Florida, May 2010. 
B.S., News-Editorial Journalism, Texas Christian University, December 2000. For their 
penetrating insights, my deepest gratitude to Bob Bernius, Esq.; Randy Hammer, President and 
Publisher, Asheville Citizen-Times; Dennis Larry, Esq.; the Honorable Paul Rasmussen (who 
also is the best dad in the world); Chuck Tobin, Esq.; and the editors, members and staff of the 
Florida Law Review. Finally, a woman could not ask for better mentors in this fascinating field 
of media law than Professor Lyrissa B. Lidsky and Barbara W. Wall, Esq. This Comment 
expresses my own views and not necessarily those of the people who shared their expertise with 
me. 
 1. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Jews for Jesus is a nonprofit evangelical group dedicated to converting Jews to 
Christianity. Jews for Jesus, About Us, http://www.jewsforjesus.org/about (last visited June 27, 
2009); see also Jews for Jesus, What Christians Should Know About Jews for Jesus, 
http://files.jewsforjesus.org/pdf/other/what-christians-should-know.pdf. 
 4. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1100. 
 5. Id. at 1101. 
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training and supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.6 
On appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the 
dismissal of the defamation claim, but, “because of uncertainty in this 
area of the law,” certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of 
whether Florida recognizes the tort of false light.7 The Florida Supreme 
Court held that Florida does not recognize a cause of action for false 
light invasion of privacy but does recognize defamation by implication.8 
The court further held that a communication can be defamatory if it 
prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a substantial and respectable 
minority of the community.9 
Boston lawyers Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first 
articulated the common law tort of invasion of privacy in 1890.10 Dean 
William Prosser, a leading tort law scholar, conceptualized false light 
invasion of privacy in 196011 when he argued that invasion of privacy 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. Rapp brought these five claims in three complaints, all of which the trial court 
dismissed. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1101–02. 
 8. Id. at 1108, 1114. 
 9. Id. at 1115. A companion case to Rapp, Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc., 994 So. 2d 
1048 (Fla. 2008) (Anderson II), actually garnered more attention from both the popular press 
and the legal community, most likely because of the $18.28 million false light jury verdict 
imposed against the media defendant for wholly truthful statements. See, e.g., Patricia Avidan, 
Comment, Protecting the Media’s First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making False Light 
Plaintiffs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STETSON L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2005) (stating that the 
Anderson verdict and its hefty award “caused alarm” among media companies and their 
advocates); Stephen Nohlgren, Verdict Shows Truth No Shield, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 4, 
2004, at 1B, available at 2004 WLNR 3736911 (stating “the verdict has flabbergasted attorneys 
for newspapers” and quoting the reporter’s lawyer who described the verdict as “ludicrous”). 
 In Anderson, a Pensacola News Journal article—one in a four-day investigative series 
published in 1998—focused on an influential road paver’s political influence but also recounted 
a 1988 hunting accident in which the paver, Joe Anderson, Jr., shot and killed his wife. Gannett 
Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1, 2–3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Anderson I). Although Anderson 
conceded that the facts in the article were true, he claimed that its failure to state that the 
authorities ruled the shooting accidental until two sentences after the original mention of the 
shooting created the false impression that he murdered his wife and escaped criminal 
prosecution because of his political influence. Id. Nearly three years later, however, the Florida 
First District Court of Appeal reversed the jury award, ruling that the trial court should have 
dismissed the case because Anderson mischaracterized his lawsuit as a false light claim to evade 
the two-year statute of limitations in defamation cases. Id. at 8–9. On the same day it released 
the Rapp opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in A derson that because Florida does not 
recognize false light, the statute of limitations issues raised on appeal were moot. Anderson II, 
994 So. 2d at 1050 & n.2. 
 10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890) (arguing that the common law should protect an individual’s right to be left alone). 
 11. The Florida Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy (without specific 
recognition of false light) as a common law cause of action in 1944 in Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 
2d 243, 250–51 (Fla. 1944) (“[T]he great fundamental object and principle of the common law 
was the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all his inherent and essential rights and 
2
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consists of four separate torts: intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing 
private facts about the plaintiff; publicity which places the plaintiff in a 
false light in the public eye; and appropriation, for the defendant’s 
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.12 In 1977, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts codified Dean Prosser’s description of 
the four categories of invasion of privacy and defined false light as 
follows: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another 
that places the other before the public in a false light is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter 
and the false light in which the other would be 
placed.13 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed false light invasion 
of privacy in 1967 in Time, Inc. v. Hill.14 Building on New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan,15 the seminal defamation case decided three years 
earlier, the Hill  Court held that a false light plaintiff must prove actual 
malice against a media defendant.16 Seven years later, in Cantrell v. 
Forest City Publishing Co.,17 the Court ruled that a newspaper and its 
reporter placed the Cantrell family in a false light when the paper 
knowingly or recklessly published inaccuracies and falsehoods about 
the widow of a man who died when a bridge collapsed.18 The Court has 
not addressed false light in over a quarter of a century, helping render 
                                                                                                                     
to afford him a legal remedy for their invasion . . . [but] ‘[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit 
the publication of matter which is of legitimate public or general interest. At some point the 
public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual’s desire for 
privacy.’”) (citation omitted). Cason involved the invasion of privacy torts of misappropriation 
and the publication of private information. Id. at 244–45. For an excellent discussion of the 
origin and development of false light in both the United States and Florida, see generally 
Avidan, supra note 9, at 231–44. 
 12. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Russell G. Donaldson, 
Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy: Cognizability and Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22 
(1987) (listing the five elements of false light as relation to a private matter, falsity, publicity, a 
high degree of offensiveness to a reasonable person, and actual malice). 
 14. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 16. Hill , 385 U.S. at 387–88. 
 17. 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
 18. Id. at 247–48, 253. 
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the tort “the least-recognized and most controversial aspect of invasion 
of privacy.”19 
As the Florida Supreme Court notes in Rapp, it had never before 
considered the issue of false light invasion of privacy other than in 
dicta.20 Prior to the Rapp and Anderson opinions, the leading false light 
appellate case in Florida was Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.21 In 
Heekin, the plaintiff alleged that a 60 Minutes segment on domestic 
violence falsely portrayed him as a spousal abuser by juxtaposing an 
interview with his ex-wife with stories and pictures of women who were 
abused and killed by their domestic partners.22 Heekin conceded the 
specific facts about him in the broadcast were true, and the trial court 
granted CBS’ motion to dismiss, in part, because Heekin failed to state 
a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy when he did not 
allege that the information in the broadcast was false.23 The appellate 
court reversed, however, holding that falsity of information is not an 
element of false light.24 On remand, the trial court granted CBS’ motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the broadcast did not convey 
a false impression.25 The appellate court affirmed without an opinion.26 
As with false light, the Florida Supreme Court had never considered 
defamation by implication until Rapp; however, Florida appellate courts 
had previously recognized the cause of action.27 In Boyles v. Mid-
Florida Television Corp.,28 the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994) (citations omitted). About 
two-thirds of states recognize false light, while about one-third either never recognized it or 
initially recognized it and then rejected the cause of action altogether. Avidan, supra note 9, at 
236. The majority of states that have rejected the tort (now, including Florida) have done so 
“because of the ‘overlap’ between false light and defamation.” Id.; see also J. Clark Kelso, 
False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 788, 835 (1992) (“Because the 
overlap between defamation and false light is so pronounced even in theory, it is no surprise that 
false light and defamation almost always go hand in hand, and the cases involving allegations of 
both defamation and false light are the single largest class of false light cases. . . . It is time to 
end the confusion and declare that false light [invasion of] privacy forms no part of the common 
law.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 369 (1989) (arguing that because of its duplication of defamation, false 
light is “a conceptually empty tort,” and states with a commitment to freedom of speech will 
ultimately feel compelled to refuse to recognize its existence).  
 20. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 2008). 
 21. 789 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). 
 22. Id. at 357. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 359 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla 1944)). 
 25. Amended Order at 1, 2, Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., No. 99-5478-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
12th Dist. July 28, 2003). 
 26. Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 892 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (unpublished table 
opinion). 
 27. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1107 (Fla. 2008). 
 28. 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). 
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reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a libel per se claim based on a 
news broadcast that implied that the plaintiff was a habitual tormentor 
of retarded patients, that he had raped a patient in his care, and that he 
was a suspect in the death of a mentally retarded child who lived in a 
group home operated by the plaintiff’s mother.29 And in Brown v. 
Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.,30 the Florida First District Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging 
the newspaper published a story about a murder trial, accompanied by a 
photograph of the plaintiff identified as the murder defendant.31 
Armed only with Florida intermediate appellate court opinions and 
United States Supreme Court opinions dating back to the 1960s and 70s, 
the Florida Supreme Court in the instant case was essentially writing on 
a blank slate. In doing so, it initially recognized that although it had 
previously acknowledged the four categories of invasion of privacy, 
including false light, none of the cases specifically recognized the 
right.32 In analyzing this issue of first impression, the court focused on 
the public policy implications of recognizing the tort33 by comparing it 
and then contrasting it with defamation.34 
The court first acknowledged false light proponents’ argument that 
false light, unlike defamation, allows recovery for literally true 
statements that create a false impression,35 but disposed of this 
argument by reinforcing the fact that Florida allows for recovery for 
defamation by implication, in which literally true statements that create 
a false impression of the plaintiff can be defamatory.36 The state’s jury 
instructions, the court said, recognize that a statement is not defamatory 
if its “gist” is true;37 conversely, according to the court, defamation law 
will not protect defendants who have “‘the details right but the ‘gist’ 
wrong.’”38 
The court next addressed the nature of the interests protected by 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 630–31, 641. 
 30. 440 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 
 31. Id. at 589–90; see also Anderson I, 947 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (rejecting 
the assertion that only false light claims can be based on statements that are true). 
 32. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1103 (“[W]e have reviewed each of the[] cases [that acknowledge 
the four general categories of invasion of privacy] and conclude that the Court was simply 
repeating citations from academic treatises or law review articles about privacy torts in general 
or discussing an alternative tort in particular.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1105–06. 
 35. Id. at 1106. 
 36. Id. Although the court stated that “defamation by implication . . . has a longstanding 
history in defamation law,” id., that tradition does not extend to Florida. Seesupra notes 27–31 
and accompanying text. While three appellate courts in Florida have recognized the existence of 
this cause of action, the Florida Supreme Court has not approved of any of these decisions. 
 37. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1107. 
 38. Id. at 1108 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 117, § 116 (5th ed. Supp. 1988)).  
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each tort, concluding that defamation protects the objective interest of 
reputation while false light protects the subjective interest of emotional 
injury.39 Because Florida courts have recognized defamation by 
implication, and because the interests protected by the two torts are “too 
subtle” in their distinctions, the court stated that little justification exists 
for the recognition of false light.40  
The court next acknowledged how First Amendment rights would be 
negatively affected by the recognition of false light, noting the chilling 
effect caused by the vagueness of the “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person standard.”41 The court also enumerated a number of privileges 
and safeguards associated with defamation but not false light.42 The 
court noted that other states, including Tennessee, Utah, and West 
Virginia, simply extend the defamation safeguards to false light causes 
of action.43 The Florida Supreme Court, however, left this option open 
to the Legislature.44 Ultimately, because the court concluded that “false 
light is largely duplicative of existing torts, but without the attendant 
protections of the First Amendment,” it declined to recognize the tort of 
false light but did recognize the tort of defamation by implication.45  
Finally, the court held that an allegedly defamatory statement must 
be evaluated from the standpoint of a “‘substantial and respectable’ 
minority of the community,” thereby adopting comment (e) to § 559 of 
the Restatement.46 The court declined to consider the merits of Rapp’s 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 1109 (quoting Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ohio 2007)); see 
also Posting of Marc Randazza to Citizen Media Law Project, Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, 
Rehnquist in Brennan’s Robes, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/rapp-v-jews-jesus-
rehnquist-brennans-robes (Oct. 24, 2008) (stating that false light provides compensation for 
“mere hurt feelings.”). Similarly, former Florida Supreme Court Justice Harry Lee Anstead 
described the false light standard as a “thin-skinned” one. Oral Argument, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. 
Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC06-2491), available at 
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/08-03.html. 
 40. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1109 (quoting Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 902 
(Colo. 2002)). Also of concern to the court was the subjective nature of the false light standard. 
Id. at 1110. “[U]tilizing a subjective standard that ‘fails to draw reasonably clear lines between 
lawful and unlawful conduct’ may impermissibly restrict free speech under the First 
Amendment.” Id. (quoting Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. 1994)). 
 41. Id. at 1110. 
 42. Id. at 1111–12. For example, these include the statutory requirement that a 
prospective plaintiff give a media defendant notice five days before initiating a civil action, and 
a statutory limit on damages when certain criteria are met. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1112. 
 44. Id. (“In fact, we note that this matter has already been studied by the Legislature, but 
no action has yet been taken.”). 
 45. Id. at 1100. 
 46. Id. at 1115 (“[A]n unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal hatred to constitute 
a cause of action. No falsehood is thought about or even known by all the world. No conduct is 
hated by all.”). Id. Justice Wells dissented on this point, stating that, “[t]he standard of a 
‘substantial and respectable minority’ is plainly too vague to be a fairly applied standard. There 
is no way to know how many it takes to constitute a ‘substantial’ number or what constitutes a 
6
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defamation claim and remanded it to the Florida Fourth District Court 
of Appeal for consideration.47 
Members of the media and their advocates rejoiced at the opinion,48 
and rightfully so. The Florida Supreme Court reinforced the First 
Amendment limits on defamation law by eliminating a cause of action 
that duplicates defamation but is devoid of the constitutional and 
statutory safeguards essential to freedom of expression. The rejection of 
the tort also protects media defendants from plaintiffs who use false 
light as an end run around defamation law and its strict requirements.49 
Significantly, the court also places First Amendment interests above 
those “relatively few unique situations”50 in which statements are 
offensive but not necessarily defamatory.51 Thus, news organizations 
are free to publish statements without a fear of litigation brought by 
plaintiffs with hurt feelings. In striking the balance between the right of 
privacy and First Amendment interests, the court weighs in favor of the 
latter. 
Ironically, though, by recognizing defamation by implication, the 
court eroded many of the protections it had just bestowed. Given, for 
example, the strong overlap between defamation by implication and 
false light,52 the elimination of the latter is unlikely to serve as a 
                                                                                                                     
‘respectable minority.’ What does ‘respectable’ mean in this context?” Id. at 1116. (Wells, J., 
dissenting).  
 47. Id. at 1114. 
 48. See, e.g., Lucy Morgan, Florida Court Rejects “False Light” Lawsuit, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at 7B (“‘This is an incredible victory for anybody who 
reports or comments on issues of public concern. . . . The sort of mud bog false light threw us 
into for the past [ten] years has been damaging to journalism and to public knowledge and 
understanding.’” (quoting St. Petersburg Times lawyer Alison Steele) “‘This is a great day, not 
only for the News Journal and Gannett, but also for newspapers and the media who will all 
benefit from this decision . . . It’s been a long experience.’” (quoting Pensacola News Journal 
president and publisher Kevin Doyle)). 
 49. For further discussion of a plaintiff’s use of false light as a means to evade 
defamation’s shorter statute of limitations, see supra note 9 (discussing Joe Anderson, Jr.’s 
claim against the Pensacola News Journal nd parent company Gannett).  
 50. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1114. 
 51. The court gives as an example the portrayal of the plaintiff as suffering from a 
terminal illness, a statement that is “not necessarily defamatory, but [is] potentially highly 
offensive.” Id. at 1113 (quoting Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 902–03 (Colo. 
2002)). Interestingly, another strong example seems to be the portrayal of a Jewish plaintiff who 
converted to Christianity. Some scholars have argued for a limited doctrine of false light that 
targets such statements. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of 
False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 887, 919 (1991) (advocating for 
“a limited doctrine of false light” for “nondisparaging false statements” that are “highly 
offensive.”).  
 52. The Rapp court itself stated that the different standards—highly offensive to a 
reasonable person for false light versus injury to reputation in the community for defamation—
is the main distinction between the elements of the two torts and is “a distinction without a 
7
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deterrent to plaintiffs who feel they have been either injured or 
offended.53 Simply put, the effect is not to protect the news media from 
litigation that would chill speech, but merely to collapse one set of 
cases, false light, into another, defamation by implication.54 
More significant, though, is the fact that wholly true statements can 
still give rise to claims against the media. That is, journalists in Florida 
are still chilled by a requirement that they always consider not only 
whether their statements are capable of a defamatory meaning, but a 
defamatory implication as well. Such a determination is difficult for the 
reporter and difficult for the court to resolve at the summary judgment 
stage and could result in costly defamation litigation, 55 which creates a 
strong chilling effect. 56  
Along those same lines, the court’s adoption of comment (e) to 
§ 559 of the Restatement as the “community” standard for analyzing a 
                                                                                                                     
difference in practice because conduct that defames will often be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, just as conduct that is highly offensive will often result in injury to one’s 
reputation.” Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1109. 
 53. See Barbara Busharis, What’s Truth Got To Do With It?—The Florida Supreme Court 
Recognizes Defamation by Implication, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Winter 2009, at 4, 5 (stating that few, 
if any, plaintiffs will be seriously disadvantaged by foreclosing false light as a separate cause of 
action). 
 54. Concededly, defamation by implication has always been an available cause of action 
in Florida, but the state has not seen the spate of defamation by implication cases that it has of 
false light cases, especially since the $18 million A derson verdict in 2003. Contrast the 
existence of three appellate defamation by implication cases with the comments of James 
McGuire, a partner in the media law firm of Thomas, LoCicero & Bralow in Tampa, who said 
that the majority of his firm’s cases in the last three years have been false light cases. James 
McGuire, Partner, Thomas, LoCicero & Bralow, Panel Discussion on False Light at the Annual 
Hot Topics in Media Law Workshop in Tampa, Fla. (Apr. 4, 2008) (notes on file with author) 
[hereinafter Panel Discussion on False Light]; see also supra note 36 (discussing Florida’s scant 
treatment of defamation by implication). It seems feasible then that plaintiffs who formerly 
would have brought false light claims will now try to bring defamation by implication claims 
instead. 
 55. The juxtaposition of two truthful sentences in one article in a multi-day series 
spawned an eight-year legal battle between Gannett and road paver Anderson. S e upra note 9. 
 56. Robyn Tomlin, Executive Editor of the Wilmington (N.C.) Star-News and former 
Executive Editor of the Ocala Star-Banner, said the Anderson verdict had a strong negative 
impact on media outlets in Florida. Robyn Tomlin, Executive Editor, Wilmington (N.C.) Star-
News, Panel Discussion on False Light, supra note 54 (notes on file with author). Although 
editors at Ms. Tomlin’s former paper never declined to run a particular story in the wake of the 
verdict, she said they were overly conscientious about the order in which statements appeared in 
stories. Id. Further, Ms. Tomlin said editors began to strongly evaluate, when deciding to pursue 
a particular story or not, whether the subject or subjects of the story were overly rich or 
litigious. Id. Though false light is no longer recognized in Florida, this same danger of costly 
litigation and large jury verdicts is now present in claims for defamation by implication. It is 
important to note, however, that although defamation by implication can still impose liability 
for truthful speech that creates a false implication, it is clearly preferable to false light because 
of the constitutional and statutory protections that mitigate the impact of the tort. 
8
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defamation claim is also likely to cause further litigation. The court 
does little to define what a “substantial and respectable minority of the 
community”57 is, except to quote from a 1914 case saying that a 
reputational injury in a plaintiff’s “personal, social, official or business 
relations” is sufficient to support a defamation claim.58 Beyond these 
vagueness concerns, though, is the reality that a “community” standard 
will allow more claims to reach the trial stage. 
The Rapp opinion, therefore, is not the sweeping victory for First 
Amendment proponents and news organizations that it may initially 
appear to be. To be sure, its rejection of false light in favor of 
constitutional protections for speech is forceful and likely to influence 
other courts to rule likewise. However, its recognition of defamation by 
implication has the potential to accomplish precisely what the court 
feared would occur with the false light standard: a strong chilling effect 
on speech brought about by more costly defamation litigation. 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 58. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1115 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Land v. 
Tampa Times Publ’g Co., 67 So. 130, 130 (Fla. 1914)). As an example, the court lists a doctor 
who had been represented as advertising his or her services. Id. What the court does not address, 
though (and what is most germane to this discussion), is whether a Jewish woman’s reputation 
would be injured in the eyes of a “substantial and respectable minority of the community” by a 
report that she had converted to Christianity. 
9
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